Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent: The Shapers of West Virginia Law, Part I by Reid, John
Volume 65 Issue 1 Article 3 
December 1962 
Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent: The Shapers of West 
Virginia Law, Part I 
John Reid 
New York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Legal Biography Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John Reid, Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent: The Shapers of West Virginia Law, Part I, 65 W. Va. L. 
Rev. (1962). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol65/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent:
The Shapers of West Virginia Law, Part I
JOHN RIm*
Professor Reid has searched for some time for a book or
pamphlet written by Judge Dent, entitled Socialism Resistless:
Or His Kingdom Cometh or True Socialism. Thus far, the
search has not produced the document. Anyone knowing where
this book or pamphlet may be located is requested to contact
the West Virginia Law Review.-Editor.
Legal history is the bantling of law studies in America. While
tolerated in a few states, it is, in others, all too often a sterile learn-
ing, occasionally praised but seldom pursued. Several jurisdictions,
notably Massachusetts and New Hampshire, have recently capped
years of quiet activity with detailed and scholarly dissertations tracing
local judicial institutions back to their beginnings, over three hundred
years ago.' Others, such as Utah and West Virginia, states which
were not established until the second half of the last century, do
not even have the vignette with which to start a monograph. The
reasons are varied. In Utah the Church controls many of the records
and insists upon the right of censorship, thus putting a dampener
on serious, objective investigation.2 In West Virginia the difficulty
seems to be that the profession is apathetic towards its heritage.3
This is in sharp contrast to New Hampshire where Chief Justice
Kenison recently testified to the practical importance of legal bi-
Assistant Professor of Law, New York University.
'SMrr, CoLoNAL JUSTICE fN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS (1961); HAsK-
INS, LAW AND AUTHOR=T IN EARLY MAsACHUSETrS (1960); PAGE, JUDCIAL
BEGRINGS IN NEw HAmpSHmE (1959). See also DnvsoND, THE SUPERiOR
COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS: ITS OGIN AND DEVELOpMENT (1960).
2 Kimball, Book Review, 7 UTAH L. REv. 281, 285 (1960).
3 Despite the fact that West Virginia has practically no written legal
history, a recent survey reported that West Virginia lawyers thought they
could still "do with less." Mueller & Skolnick, Bar Reactions to Legal
Periodicals: The West Virginia Survey, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 197, 202 (1958).
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ography4 and where publication has been supported by the organ-
ized bar.5
Just what accounts for this difference between West Virginia
and New Hampshire is something which cannot be satisfactorily
explained. In fact, at first impression, it might be guessed that
West Virginia would have a greater interest in legal history than
New Hampshire because, after all, it was established as the result
of a legal controversy (i.e., Virginia's right to secede from the
Union), while New Hampshire was settled for no better reason
than that fishing was good on the Piscataqua River. One explana-
tion might be the fact that judicial biography has been the founda-
tion upon which much of the legal history of nineteenth century
America has been built. Had New York not had a Kent, Massa-
chusetts a Shaw, and New Hampshire a Doe, our knowledge of
the legal history of those states might be no further advanced than
is our knowledge of the legal history of West Virginia, not only
because the study of their lives furnished the material upon which
to build but also because their colorful personalities aroused a
curiosity in legal history which no West Virginia judge has been
able to kindle.6 Governor Atkinson, an amateur historian, if there
ever was one,7 tried to remedy this but unhappily went too far.
4 "We can never fully understand our legal traditions and institutions
unless we also appreciate the fact that the pioneering genius of Jeremiah
Smith was solidified by the judicial dignity of William Richardson, that
Joel Parker's introduction of equity was made workable by the patient labor
of Samuel Dana Bell, that Ira Perley's inevitable temper was balanced by
Henry A. Bellows' distaste for controversy, and that Charles Doe's reforms
succeeded only after overwhelming the desperate rear-guard action of Alonzo
P. Carpenter." Kenison, New Hampshire Chief Justices in the Nineteenth
Century, 2 N.H.B.J. 93 (1960).
5 It is significant that Professor Marke, in his discussion, for the ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW, of work currently being done in legal history,
has recently devoted much of his limited space to praising New Hampshire
scholarship. Marke, Legal History and Bibliography, 1960 ANN. SURVEY
AM. L. 627, 629-30 (1961); Marke, Legal Bibliography and History, 1959
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 691, 693-94 (1960).
6 In reviewing a book on Lincoln's law practice, Professor Kimball be-
moaned the expenditures of effort which go into duplicating works on Lincoln
as a lawyer which might be more meaningful if directed towards a study of
mid-west law practice in general in the nineteenth century: "To most readers,
history seems so much more interesting, somehow, when one ties it to a
well-known name and face." Kimball, Book Review, 7 UTAH L. REv. 285,
286 (1960).7 He was also an amateur historiographer, sharing with Carlyle the
notion that "Biography is the only true history." ATKlNsoN, BENCH AND
BAR OF WEST VIRGINIA iv (1919). (See also similar remarks by Dean Jones,
Jones, Introduction, id. at ix.) Atkinson may have stopped to consider
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In his Bench and Bar of West Virginia he depicted every lawyer
about whom he wrote in such glowing colors that readers are left
with the impression that the West Virginia Bar before 1920 was
made up of saintly though dull supermen or else that Atkinson
was either naive or a credulous blurbist. To have to depend upon
such a book as a major source of material would have an un-
fortunate effect on the prospects for legal history in any jurisdiction.
Actually there is some puissance in Atkinson's approach because
(although he unintentionally burlesqued it by failing to acknowledge
that every West Virginia lawyer is not a great lawyer) the great
man theory does have a place in the writing of legal history. Roscoe
Pound has spoken of "the personal stamp of the great lawyer"
which he found upon all the legal systems he had studied.' And
Justice Frankfurter has suggested that we cannot have an adequate
judicial history until we rescue the court from "the limbo of im-
personality."9 The disservice which Atkinson did West Virginia
was to obscure the fact that, at the turn of the century, when West
Virginia law was emerging from the period of the "founding fathers,"
the Supreme Court of Appeals was dominated by two colorful per-
sonalities, two "shapers"-Henry Brannon of Weston and Marina-
duke Dent of Grafton. A study of these two men would go far
toward laying the foundation for a legal history of West Virginia.
Their rivalry is the stuff from which good history is made. Their
"stamp" is indeliably pressed on West Virginia law. Strong, opinion-
ated judges, they stood on opposite sides of many of the most
challenging problems of their day and, by tugging and pulling
against one another, they not only, as a pair, contributed more
than any other two judges to the ultimate course of West Virginia
law, but, as glossarists of competing social philosophies, they made
that law reflect the West Virginia in which they lived.
8 "The personality of Labeo, of Julian, and perhaps of Papinian has
entered into Roman law. The stamp of Tribonian is on the Corpus Juris
and thus on the great quarry of legal materials for the modem world. The
stamp of Du Moulin and of Pothier is on French law. To mention no others,
Henry II and Coke and Mansfield stand out as personally responsible for
things of the first moment in English law. In American law Marshall has
been pronounced rightly the creator of the constitution . . . . Kent and
Story were the chief actors-in the reception of English law in the forepart
of the nineteenth century, without whom it might not have been complete.
Shaw and Gibson and Ruffin and later Doe left their marks upon the law
of their jurisdictions and to some extent upon the law of the whole country."
POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HIsTORY, 138-39 (1923).
9 FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND
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The West Virginia in which Henry Brannon and Marmaduke
Dent lived at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth centuries, may be glimpsed by a study of their judicial
opinions. It was a land of Bible and jug, of vendetta and vigilante;
of moonshine and mountaineers; of land grabbers and oil jobbers;
of The Strange Schemes of Randolph Mason and The Night of the
Hunter; of veterans who had served in rival armies and homes still
rent by civil war; of women born to home-spun tiers who would
live to be buried in store-bought clothes and men born to venatic
youths who would live to be buried in mining shafts; and of com-
mercial drummers with battered suitcases alighting from the noonday
train and of geographical recluses to whom the peaks around their
valleys were the curbstones of the world. It was a land of tight
little communities in which the county seat was the paragon of
culture, sophistication, and diversion. The railroad did not come to
Weston until 1879. Morgantown was not connected with Fair-
mont until 1886. It was not an affluent land but, with the recent
discovery of oil, gas, and coal, it was as prosperous as most of
the nation; a different state from that of the "Help Pull West Vir-
ginia Out of the Mud" campaign of the 1920's and the "depressed
areas" legislation of the 1960's. It was a land served by the small
law office with books piled high on tables beneath a green-shaded
light bulb hanging from the ceiling and a stream of indigent clients
with petty cases climbing a long dark flight of squeaking stairs.
From such offices John W. Davis would go to New York to manage
larger matters and Newton D. Baker would start for Washington
to handle affairs of state. But Brannon and Dent would never
escape from the West Virginia law office nor would they ever try.
While on the bench they dealt with the petty cases of an agrestic
people-the petty cases which form the heart of the American legal
system, for they reflect the every day society of turn-of-the-century
West Virginia just as the cases in the Yearbooks reflect the aristo-
cratic society of medieval England.
Henry Brannon, an Episcopal of Irish descent, served two
terms on the Supreme Court of Appeals, from 1888 to 1912. He
originally was elected as a Democrat but, in 1900, disenchanted
with Bryanism, ran as a Republican.1" Marmaduke Dent, a Presby-
' 0 Vandervort, The Supreme Court of West Virginia, (Part II), 12
GREEN BAG 292, 299 (1900). Vandervort, the contemporary historian of
the Brannon-Dent court, says that Brannon had been a Democrat but, never-
theless, "is quite liberal in his opinions." Ibid.
[ Vol. 65
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terian of English-Welsh descent, served only one term, beginning
in 1893. He lost his bid for reelection, in 1904, falling victim to
the shift in political fortunes which had made West Virginia a Re-
publican state. All his life, Dent remained a staunch, uncompromis-
ing Democrat.
The differences between the two men-their philosophical lean-
ings, their judicial attitudes, their social prejudices, their legal
lodestars, their jurisprudential ideals, as well as their respective
places upon the court, may best be discerned from the cases in which
one dissents from the other's opinion. These were the cases where
competing traditions battled to control the future direction of West
Virginia law; the cases which shaped its course in the first half of
the twentieth century.
Typical of these cases was Gall v. Bank-typical because
Brannon wrote in his usual laconic style while Dent quoted poetry,
because Brannon approached on the narrow road of precedent
while Dent arrived on the board avenue of principal, because Bran-
non's opinion consists almost entirely of quotations from authorities
which support his position while Dent has only one direct quote,
because Brannon takes the side of a bank while Dent takes the side
of a farmer, and because Brannon wrote for the court while Dent
filed a lone dissent. The plaintiffs alleged that they, as sureties for
a bond, had signed an agreement with the defendant bank to com-
promise the claim, in return for which the defendant promised to
cancel the bond. After they paid, the defendant did not cancel and,
instead, brought legal action to collect the remaining amount. The
plaintiffs prayed for equitable relief, asking that the court enjoin the
action and decree cancellation of the bond.11
"In short," wrote Dent, "their allegation is that the proceedings
at law are in furtherance of the fraud perpetrated on plaintiffs by
withholding from the plaintiffs the bond stipulated after plaintiffs had
fully complied with their part of the compromise.2
"The rights upon that bond were legal rights, if any existed,"
Brannon said, "the right of defense against that bond based on the
compromise and payment was a legal defense, both cognizable at
law."
13
11 Gall v. Bank, 50 W. Va. 597, 40 S.E. 390 (1901).12 Id. at 601, 40 S.E. at 392 (dissenting opinion).
13Id at 598, 40 S.E. at 392.
1962]
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"The question," Dent replied, "is not as to which court has
the prior jurisdiction, but whether equity has jurisdiction to prevent
the defendants from doing what they bargained not to do to the
harrassment and injury of the plaintiffs."14
Brannon preferred to reply on familiar axioms. "Where the
right is legal," he wrote "equity will not exercise jurisdiction, if the
legal remedy is adequate."'"
Dent thought the "remedy at law is wholly inadequate" and
listed five reasons why,'" summing his position up by warning:
"Under this holding in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction fraud
by increasing fraud may select its own tribunal and thereby oust the
jurisdiction of equity."' 7
Brannon was not impressed. "Even when there is no action
at law actually pending," he insisted, "equity does not take jurisdic-
tion to cancel a document except under special circumstances..."' 8
"Discovery, disadvantage at law, deprivation of evidence, deceit
practiced, and default of legal remedy, all call for equitable inter-
ference," Dent replied. "The equity of this case is too plain for
further comment. It is not though an infringement of the ordinary
policy of the times to surrender the uneducated farmer to the
protecting care of the educated banker. The law demands it, equity
sanctions it, and blind justice weeps and pleads in vain. For
'There is no power in Venice,
Can alter a decree established.
'Twill be recorded for a precedent.
And many an error, but the same example,
Will rush into the state'.""9
Judge Dent's reference to the uneducated farmer down-trodden
by the educated banker was not idle chatter inserted into this case
7Id. at 603, 40 S.E. at 393 (dissenting opinion).
Is Id. at 601, 40 S.E. at 392.
1
61d. at 601-02, 40 S.E. at 392: "Fourth, plaintiffs are compelled to
endure the harassment, the prolongation and the uncertain vicissitudes of
a law suit, while the defendants enjoy the full benefit of the fraud perpetrated
by them in securing a compromise and breaking it, and have within their
power the evidence on which the plaintiffs' right of recovery depends. Fifth,
it is neither equitable, just nor right to send plaintiffs to a court of law and
thus aid the defendants in the perpetration of their fraud..." (dissenting
opinion).7 d. at 603, 40 S.E. at 393 (dissenting opinion).
18 Id. at 598, 40 S.E. at 391.
19 1d. at 604, 40 S.E. at 393 (dissenting opinion) (citations omitted).
[ Vol. 65
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only to be forgotten by the next. As his contemporaries well knew,
he was ever prepared to balance the interests of parties, and, if
justice required, give facts greater weight than law. In one case
he boldly stated his theory that a judge, when expounding law, must
take into consideration that indefinable criteria called "justice,"
when he dissented from a decision overturning a verdict against a
railroad:
"In this case there is a powerful and wealthy corpora-
tion on the one hand with numerous and influential friends,
and a bereaved widow and fatherless children on the other,
and my deep sympathies for the appeals of the helpless and
needy may cause me to hold the scales of justice unequally
between them; but it is my sincere judgment, that the
evidence should not only have been submitted to the jury,
but, as it now stands, is plainly sufficient to warrant a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff. My convictions may appear
unreasonable to others; yet, while I highly esteem the more
mature judgment of my associates, an approving conscience
can be the only arbiter that a judicial officer can recognize
in discharging his individual duties."2
No one disagreed with this philosophy more than Judge Bran-
non. He felt that conscience was hardly a safe guide for a court to
follow. While, he too, deplored the hardships and sufferings which
the law left some people to bear alone, he regarded them as the
expected, normal risks of living in a society blessed by the achieve-
ments of the industrial revolution. Experiments with abstract justice
should never be substituted for the safety of established precedent,
no matter how harsh. In one case he met the issue head on, and,
brushing aside compassion for the victim, insisted that the defendant
corporation be given every benefit of an extremely narrow interpreta-
tion of the fellow servant law.
"The defendant is entitled to the benefit of that law,
over sympathy or feeling for the unfortunate boy, and it
ought to be so declared. The fact that Buskirk was a minor
does not take him out of the rule of fellow servants...
courts applied the rule to children of twelve and fourteen
years. The fact that the boss took him from his usual
line of work does not alter the case, because that boss was
20 Raines v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 39 W. Va. 50, 66, 19 S.E. 565,
570 (1894) (dissenting opinion).
1962]
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a mere fellow servant, and it must appear that he had
authority to act."2 '
The significance of the fellow servant rule has long since been
legislated out of the law by Workmen Compensation Acts. But at the
turn of the century it was still a very live issue in West Virginia.
There was probably no better index to the social philosophy of a
judge than his opinions in fellow servant cases. As might be expected
from the last quotation, Brannon took a very strong stand on what he
termed "this subject of fellow-servantcy (to coin a word to express
the idea in one word)."2 He had freely called the employee who
had directed the boy to divert from his usual line of work "the boss,"
yet insisted that for purposes of recovery against the plaintiff's em-
ployer he was a mere fellow servant until it was shown "he had
authority to act." Dent's position had originally been somewhat
similar to Brannon's. In one of his first cases he reversed a plain-
tiff's verdict against his employer as "capriciousness," scolded the
jury for "preconceived prejudices and feelings," and laid down as
harsh a rule as could be expounded under the common law. 3 Within
four years he had come to see fellow servant cases in a different light
and, by 1897, was attempting to set West Virginia on a new course
by dissenting from the approach endorsed by his colleagues. In
what was, perhaps, the most interesting of these cases, he found him-
self in -the unusual position of arguing for stare decisis.2 While
Brannon, who was attempting to give employers even greater im-
munity than they had previously enjoyed by establishing the rule that
a master is not liable for negligence resulting from an act usually "in
the line of one who would be a fellow servant," freely admitted he
was departing from West Virginia precedents.2" Brannon felt an
21 McVey v. St. Clair Co., 49 W. Va. 412, 425, 38 S.E. 648, 652 (1901)
(concurring opinion).22Jackson v. Norfolk & W. R.R., 43 W. Va. 380, 381, 27 S.E. 278,
279 (1897).
23 Cove v. Ohio River R.R., 38 W. Va. 456, 18 S.E. 596 (1893).
24 "The rule of stare decisis applies with impregnable force in this instance,
and from which there is no escape, even if the court were so inclined, unless
by an utter and reprehensible disregard of all precedent." Jackson v. Nor-
folk & W. R.R., 43 W. Va. 380, 401, 27 S.E. 278, 287 (1897) (dissenting
opinion).
25 "The prop has fallen from under these decisions. We ought to do
right. The supreme court [of the United States] has reversed itself. Why
should not we do so? It is not a rule of property." Id. at 392, 27 S.E.
at 283. It is interesting to note that stare decisis, as an abstract principle,
had few more vocal champions than Judge Brannon. "Quite lately I have
defended the rule of stare decisis in our court. I avow myself, except in
very rare instances, determined to stand by the rule of stare decisis, especially
in matters of property right." Brannon, The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, 25 PROC. WEST VA. BAR ASSN. 108, 122 (1909).
[ Vol. 65
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employer's liability to an injured employee should not depend on the
rank or grade of the negligent servant nor the fact he had authority
over the injured man, but rather on the "character of the negligent
act." Dent preferred to rely on traditional distinctions such as
"vice-principal" or "superior servant" which pegged liability on rank
rather than act. The clash was never sharper. Dent again balanced
the helpless victim who cannot bear the loss against the large corpora-
tion which could more easily do so. Brannon was concerned about
the effect such a solution would have on the business community.
26
Lurking always in the background of these decisions, and ex-
plaining in part the sharply divergent attitudes of Brannon and Dent,
were their contrasting philosophies of the place of business in society
and the role which government should play in regulating private enter-
prise. As is to be expected, Brannon's philosophy verged on
laissez-faire. A man who felt the common law could do little to
aid a person physically injured by a corporation while that corporation
was performing a legal function, was unlikely to find merit in the
suggestion that the economy would be strengthened if the legislature
undertook to police business activity. Natural law, he suggested,
dictates a dog-eat-dog atmosphere in the commercial world and it
cannot be helped. In a case involving no less a master of jungle war-
fare than Standard Oil of New Jersey, Brannon, in holding that a
small corporation had no action against a large corporation which in-
tended to destroy it and was destroying it, so long as the large
corporation acted lawfully,2" unburdened himself of many thoughts
26 While in the Jackson case, supra note 24, is perhaps the best opinion
for comparing Brannon and Dent's contrasting views concerning the imposi-
tion of risks upon business enterprises, it reveals only one dimension of their
struggle, for judges capable of taking such opposite stands on principles
were quite likely to regard facts from entirely different points of view and
come up with completely contrary interpretations. For an excellent example
of Dent reading facts to benefit a plaintiff and Brannon reading them to
favor a railroad see, Meeks v. Ohio River Ry., 52 W. Va. 99, 43 S.E. 118
(1902) (Dent for the court, Brannon dissenting). In wbt is perhaps the
classic case of this type, Dent even inferred that Brannon was juggling the
facts to suit himself. See, Miller v. Insurance Co., 54 W. Va. 344, 46 S.E.
181 (1903) (Brannon for the court, Dent dissenting).
27 The plaintiff (engaged in transporting petroleum by pipe lines and
tank cars from Vonano to Parkersburg and in storing oil) accused Standard
Oil of "maliciously and wickedly contriving and intending to ruin the plain-
tiff and its business, and render its plant and property worthless. . ." Brannon
held that a combination and agreement by several persons to do a lawful
act, violative of no duty owed another, is not an unlawful conspiracy sub-
jecting them to an action by him, though the act was intended to and did
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on the problem, including an analogy to another master of the
jungle-the lion.
"It is the act of persons and corporations, by union
of means and effort, drawing to themselves, in the field
of competition, the lion's share of trade. This is not
monopoly condemned by law. The lion has stretched out
his paws and grabbed in prey more than others; but that
is the natural right of the lion in the field of pursuit and
capture. Pity that the lion exists, his competing animals
may say; but natural law accords it the right, it is given
him by the Maker for existence."'
8
Brannon's version of laissez-faire had Darwinian undertones.
"That in these days of sharp, ruinous competition some
perish is inevitable. The dead are found strewn all along the
highways of business and commerce. Has it not always been
so? The evolution of the future must answer; but we do
know that thus far the law of survival of the fittest has
been inexorable. Human intellect, human laws cannot
prevent these disasters. The dead and wounded have no
right of action from the working of this imperious law. This
is a free country; liberty must exist. It is for all, this is a
land of equality, so far as law goes, though some men do
in lust of gain get advantage. Who can help it?"' 9
Dent, who missed the human tragedy which could result from
struggles between Brobdingnagious, did not quarrel with Brannon in
cases involving impersonal business corporations fighting for sur-
vival. Instead he concentrated his judicial compassion on the in-
dividual Lilliputian being stepped on by a careless and unconcerned
Gulliver. In situations involving potential peril to citizens, Dent
was willing to go much further than his colleagues in imposing posi-
tive duties or even seeking governmental regulation. After all, he
pointed out, the law had created corporations, so why should it be
denied power to define and enforce the steps, which are necessary to
curtail whatever hazards they may pose for the general public. He
expressed his thought in Raines v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., in which
Judge Holt, speaking for the majority, had held that a railroad has a
right to assume that a trespasser, walking on the tracks, will step
28 1d. at 617-18, 40 S.E. at 593-94.
29 Id. at 621, 40 S.E. at 595.
[ Vol. 65
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aside in time to escape the danger of an onrushing train. 0 While the
remainder of the court restricted their thinking to the confines of
precedent-logic, Dent sought to show that law is a matter of degree,
and that what constitutes trespass on truly private property should not
necessarily be called trespass on property belonging to certain public
corporations.
"While the law regards a railroad track to be the
private property of the company, and the use thereof as
dangerous and perilous, yet it lies open to the commons, and
offers a dry, smooth, even, level and convenient walkway
for pedestrians, especially in populous communities and is
therefore a source of great temptation to the public. The
law, in permitting railroad companies to rush their trains
through the country at a great rate of speed, requires them
to adopt the necessary means to warn trespassers out of
their way in time for them to escape death. The ringing of
the bell and sounding of the whistle are not matters of
much exertion; neither do they in any way interfere
with or impede the running of trains."3 '
This was a theme to which Dent often returned. Railroads
existed by the grace of the public and the public expected them to
be operated with safety. Brannon did not agree.32 He believed that a
30 "Common sense and common justice applied, to the practical affairs
of the managing of railroads and the running of trains require, that there
must be left to engineers some margin for forming their judgment, which
may still be discreet, and some latitude of conduct which may in either
event be held to be prudent. He will not, on pain of conviction of negligence
in a matter involving life and limb, be held to make, on the spur of the
moment, a nicely accurate estimate of the probability that one walking on
the track is insensible of his danger, from the mere fact that he is on the
track within a distance within which the train cannot be stopped, for
common observation shows that persons fully aware of the approach of the
train cross the tracks, or fal to step off, although the train may be within
such distance; for one second or a half second in time, and two steps or
three in distance, will put him out of danger." Raines v. Chesapeake & 0.
R.R., 39 W. Va. 50, 62, 19 S.E. 565, 569 (1894). Later that same year
Judge Holt softened his attitudes, at least as to drunkards, by suggesting
that had the trespasser on the track been a boozer, known to be unconscious
or heedless of his dangerous exposure, "it will not be denied that the duty
would have arisen to take such precautions as were proper to avoid in-
fliction [of] injury." Fisher v. West Virginia & P.R.R., 39 W. Va. 366,
392, 19 S.E. 578, 588 (1894) (dissenting opinion).
3, Raines v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 39 W. Va. 50, 66, 19 S.E. 565, 570
(1894) (dissenting opinion).32 For the case which best depicts the different approaches taken by
Brannon and Dent on this problem, so important in turn-of-the-century West
Virginia, see, Bias v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 48 W. Va. 349, 33 S.E. 240
(1899). (Dent for the court, Brannon dissenting.)
1962 ]
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trespasser on a railroad track could not collect damages for injury
unless the railroad was guilty of wanton or gross negligence.3" al-
though given the right set of facts he would uphold a plaintiff's ver-
dict.34 Dent, in direct contrast, wanted to assess punitive damages
against railroads in death cases "for the preservation of human life
and prevention of unnecessary homicide."'" Their positions are
summed up by two quotations from a tort case in which the engineer,
when he first spotted the one-year-old victim on the track, mistook it
for a chicken.
Brannon:
"[T] he company is not bound to reduce speed or stop
when an object is seen on track which it has no reason
to believe is, but by possibility may be, a human being. 36
Dent:
"The undisputed circumstances show that there was
no natural object in the way to prevent the engineer from
seeing the child. The situation, therefore, necessarily
raises the presumption of negligence, and casts on the de-
fendant the burden of showing that a proper lookout was
kept, and the failure to see the child was occasioned by
other fault than that of the engineer.
'
31
As this quotation shows, Dent was more willing than Brannon
to impose positive duties upon railroads; duties which required them
to take positive measures to protect lives and property. It also shows
that he took a common sense approach to these problems, by pointing
out what practical steps were possible and balancing these steps
against the legal maxims which his colleagues were following. No-
where was this "positive-duty, common-sense" approach in sharper
contrast to the more "legalistic, precedent-bound" approach of Bran-
than in Kirk v. Norfolk & W. R.R., in which the plaintiff sought to
recover the value of cattle killed by the defendant's engine on the
33 Huff v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 48 W. Va. 45, 35 S.E. 866 (1900).
34 Gunn v. Railroad, 42 W. Va. 676, 26 S.E. 546 (1896).
11 Couch v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 45 W. Va. 51, 55 (1898). For Dent's
elaboration on this point, see Scott v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 43 W. Va.
484, 27 S.E. 211 (1897).
36Couch v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 45 W. Va. 51, 59, 30 S.E. 147
(1898). In this case there was no majority opinion and no dissent. The court
was evenly divided and although Judge Dent's opinion appears first, Judge
Brannon's is the one which prevails since it affirms the action of the lower
court sustaining the railroad's demurrer.3 7 Id. at 53, 27 S.E. at 148.
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defendant's track. Speaking for the Court, Judge English held that,
since the paramount duty owed by a railroad is to its passengers,
it may, in freezing weather, use salt to free its frogs and switches
from ice, if this is the only effective method, even though salt may
have a tendency to lure stock onto the tracks and endanger their
lives. 8 In a short, concurring opinion Brannon said "We hold the
company not responsible for killing or crippling the cattle. ."" He
accepted the defendant's testimony that salt was the only means of
keeping the frogs and switches free of ice. In a biting dissent, which
reads like an argument in conference chambers, Dent pointed out
that salt was not the only means, it was merely the cheapest means,
and if the railroad chose to save money by using salt, it, and not the
owner of the cattle, should bear the consequences."0
In his dissent, Judge Dent, with bitter sarcasm, asserted that
the majority's opinion "must be repugnant to the sense of justice
of every reasonable man not learned in the intricacies of railroad
jurisprudence."4 This reference to "railroad jurisprudence" should
touch a responsive cord in anyone familiar with the myths of Ameri-
can legal history. For, if there is one thing most lawyers seem to
believe, it is that at the turn of the century the railroads had a
stranglehold on state appellate courts. This stranglehold is blamed
38 Kirk v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 41 W. Va. 722, 24 S.E. 639 (1896).
3
9 Id. at 729, 24 S.E. at 642 (concurring opinion).4
1Id. at 731-32, 24 S.E. at 642-43: "It is plain to be seen that while
the witness says the use of salt was absolutely necessary, and that there
was no known substitute for it, yet that the real object in its use was
to avoid the additional expense caused by the necessary labor involved
in keeping the frogs and switches free from ice and snow in cold
weather. In other words, it was a 'penny wise and pound foolish'
policy, causing the unnecessary destruction of other people's property, and
increasing the dangers to its trains and passengers, which could have been
avoided by a small outlay, less than the expense of defending this suit; for
it alone will cost the company more than sufficient to have kept these par-
ticular frogs and switches free and clean from snow and ice, and properly
lubricated, by manual labor, for many winters-or if the salt was absolutely
necessary, which sounds like mere foolishness to an untutored savage at
least, to have kept a man on guard for many cold nights and days, and
secured the plaintiff and others from the loss of their stock, and avoided
a decision by this Court of that as law which must be repugnant to the
sense and justice of every reasonable man not learned in the intricacies of
railroad jurisprudence.
"To say that the use of salt is the only effective mode of freeing frogs
and switches from ice and snow in cold weather is to close our eyes to
ordinary human experience. But to say that the use of salt is the only
effective mode of freeing frogs and switches from ice and snow in cold
weather without an additional expense for manual labor and proper lubricants
is, no doubt, true. If the company adopt the cheaper of two modes to
accomplish the same purpose, it is no more than justice to require it to
provide against the increased danger, occasioned by its choice, to the property
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for all sorts of legal anomalies (grouped under the vague heading
"railroad law") and railroad power is said to have been omnipotent,
a notion unsupported by scientific research. There are simply too
many intangible factors which are, as yet, unmeasured to permit
anything but an educated guess. There is no disputing they were
powerful; in some states almost as powerful as the government.
But this is not the same as saying they controlled the course of
decisional law. Admittedly their influence was great; perhaps even
decisive whenever a judge was able to identify their interests with
his own.
It might be suggested that Marmaduke Dent's willingness to
decide cases contrary to the interests of railroad-defendants marks
him as a man of political courage. While there could be something
to this (for, after all, the railroads could assert a more positive
reaction to judicial shiftings than could their unorganized opponents),
it would hardly be crediting him with a feat of derring-do. It is
true enough that the main employer in Dent's home town was the
Baltimore & Ohio, but a Grafton lawyer could make a living rep-
resenting the other side. Furthermore, the railroads were by no
means as powerful in West Virginia as they were in some other
jurisdictions. Supreme Court Judge Daniel B. Lucas, while a mem-
ber of the legislature, had been "particularly bitter against what he
claimed were the unjust privileges possessed by the railroad com-
panies in this State," 2 and he was, by no means, a lone voice crying
in the wilderness of public apathy. As early as 1873 the Grange
had succeeded in pushing through the legislature laws fixing maxi-
mum passenger and freight rates and preventing unjust discrimina-
tion.43 Almost two decades before Dent began dealing with rail-
road cases from the bench, no less a figure than Johnson N. Camden
had been summoned before the bar of the State Senate to answer
charges of contempt for refusing to disclose the amount of rebates
the Camden Consolidated Oil Company had been allowed by the
Baltimore & Ohio.44 The Grange was still a power in West Virginia
politics during the years Dent was in judicial office. The last legis-
lature before his election had contained forty-five grangers out of
sixty-five members. 5 It was, therefore, not exactly political suicide
42 Vandervort, The Supreme Court of West Virginia, (Part H), 12 GREEN
BAG 234, 244 (1900).4 3 AMBLER, A HISTORY OF WEST VIRGINIA 399 (1933).
44Ibid.
45 6 PROC. WEST VA. B.at Ass'N 26 (1892).
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to oppose the railroads. Dent had a reputation of not being a rail-
road man long before he went on the bench, and this certainly
did not hurt him with the Populists who were the first to nominate
him for the court. In 1888, at their second annual meeting, he
had urged the members of the Bar Association to petition Congress
and the legislature for laws restricting the right of a railroad to
remove a case from a local court on the grounds that it was a
non-resident.46 In support of his resolutions he related a tale of
railroad machinations as humorous as it was tragic.
"I had a case against a railroad company. - They
brought some sixty-five great big engines right in front
of my house that blew over twelve hundred bushels of
cinders right in front of my house. I restrained them from
doing that. They certified my case to Parkersburg; it lies
there undetermined but the injunction still holds. When
they found they could not blow in front of my house,
they went to some poor little Irish woman and blew out
those engines within forty feet of her house. They blew
into everything she had, every crack of the house. I had
them arrested eighteen times; I had them fined eighteen
hundred dollars; they appealed in every case-eighteen
times. Then they claimed to be non-residents of the State
46 In support of his resolution Dent said: "Any railroad corporation can
come into the State of West Virginia and take our lands from us under
this act of eminent domain, rob us of our property, and when we dare to
bring them into our courts of justice they tell us they are nonresidents of
the State of West Virginia, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of West Virginia. This is a great wrong. They make affidavit that they
can not get justice in our courts. They insult our judges, juries, and the
members of the bar . . . This is a serious question and I have stood it as
long as I can. They remove cases from our circuit courts saying that they
cannot get justice from the judges. Not satisfied with that, they now propose
to remove cases from justices of the peace. They say 'because we can not
get justice, we will remove the case from your jurisdiction.' When my
experience has been that railroad corporations always get more than justice
from every side. It is not for the purpose of justice that these cases are
removed. It is an insult heaped upon our co urts and juries. As long as
they only insulted our judges and juries, I could stand that, but they have
gone further than that; they have gone and insulted our poor little justices,
and removed cases from them on the ground that they can't get justice,
when everybody knows that a free pass could get justice from almost any
justice in this State. Therefore, I offer these resolutions, and I want this
Association to memorialize Congress and have it fixed so they can't claim
their nonresidence." Minutes of the Meeting, PROc. 2ND ANNUA MEETiNG
WEST VA. BAP, ASS'N 71-72 (1888).
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and got an injunction from the court and still blew before
the woman's house. She brought a little suit before a justice
of the peace, and the railroad company said if necessary
they would take that to Parkersburg. Why, I don't know.
I am not posted on these questions. I have never been
in that court. The company says that it is their court; I
don't know the reason or why. I think we had about a
half dozen of those cases. The first thing I knew, they
got a certiorari and took our little case a hundred miles
away, and every time you ride to that place you have to
pay a tax to them before you can get there to stop them
from blowing. I got her an injunction and stopped them
from blowing and away went that case out of that court.""
Now, whether the blowing of cinders into his Grafton home made
Dent anti-railroad or whether he had already embarked on a
career as plaintiff's attorney in railroad liability suits, is a question
which might possibly be answered if we had available the office
records of his law practice. It is not important, however. What
is significant is the fact that, in 1892, when he first ran for the
Supreme Court of Appeals, anti-railroadism was by no means lethal.
What was politically reckless in California could be politically profit-
able in West Virginia. It might not contain as much mileage as
the other side of the coin, but it was effective for a short run.
Dent was never a railroad baiter in the demagogic sense. His
position was not so much that of politician as of student of law.
He did not quarrel with those who stressed the importance of the
railroad to West Virginia's economic well being. He just insisted
that this was not the only consideration; that the law in shielding
the railroads from the hungry scavengers waiting to feast on their
carcasses, should not ignore the legitimate claims of "poor little
Irish women." Judge Brannon, on the other hand, was impressed
by the opposite argument and, as might be expected, stressed the
disadvantages railroads faced in jury trials. Prejudice against rail-
roads on the part of jurors was a serious problem in West Virginia.
Judge Dent readily admitted this. Although he did not agree with
Zachary Taylor Vinson of Huntington that jury verdicts in these
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forms of law,"48 Dent once found it necessary to speak out against
jurors in railroad cases who ". . . are derelict in the discharge of
their duties if they ignore the evidence without cause, and find a
verdict according to their preconceived prejudices and feelings."4 9
Now, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the appellate
court's reversal of plaintiff's verdicts in railroad cases can be at-
tributed to a need to correct this prejudice as much as to any
reverse prejudice in favor of railroads. Keeping this balancing process
in mind, a check of the opinions in the West Virginia Reports,
written when both Brannon and Dent were on the bench, does not
reveal that a disproportionate number of them were decided in
favor of the railroads. Admittedly, a tabulation of naked numbers,
without considering what is behind those numbers, without separat-
ing the big important cases in which the railroads were vitally in-
terested from the minor cases they could afford to lose, means
little. But, as bare statistics, unsupported by careful analysis, they
can be used to balance the bare assertion, unsupported as yet by
historical research, that the railroads controlled the Supreme Court
of Appeals. Volume 46 and volume 47 offer as good a sampling
as any. They cover the century's turn, from March 18, 1899, to
April 14, 1900, and came at the middle of Judge Brannon's two
terms in office, at a time when Judge Dent had thoroughly mastered
his material and was in a fighting mood. Of the eighteen railroad
cases in those two volumes, one may be ignored since it was an
action between two railroads.50 Of the remaining seventeen, ten
48 Vinson, Railway Corporations and the Juries, 17 PROC. WEST VA.
BAR ASS'N 42, 43 (1901). "Every American lawyer felt that the Dreyfus
trial was an outrage upon justice for the reason that his triers were hostile
to him and his cause. Yet, I am sure that it is the experience of every
lawyer engaged in that character of litigation known as damage cases against
railroad corporations, that in State Courts the juries as a rule are partial
to the plaintiff and biased against the corporation. It has become a common
saying among members of the bar that 'if the case can only get to the jury
there will certainly be a verdict for the plaintiff.' We all know that this
hostility to railway corporations does exist in the minds of the average
jury and it so warps their judgments as to render it well nigh impossible
to get the same consideration at the hands of a jury for a railway corporation
that an individual defendant would receive under the same circumstances."
49 Cove v. Railroad, 38 W. Va. 456, 18 S.E. 596 (1893).
50 Glen Jean, & D. Ry. v. Kanawha, G. J. & E. R.R., 47 W. Va. 725,
35 S.E. 978 (1900). In this case, Dent "held" for neither railroad, but
rather reversed, "in part" only, a judgment of the lower court dismissing
the action. Although litigation between two railroads did not involve the
liability issues which usually divided Brannon and Dent, it is interesting
to note that two years earlier a suit between these same railroads had seen
Brannon dissent from an opinion written by Dent. Kanawha, G. J. & E.
R.R. v. Glen Jean, L. L. & D. W. R.R., 45 W. Va. 119, 30 S.E. 86 (1898).
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were decided in favor of the railroad,' seven in favor of the other
side. 2 In all but four of these the railroad was the defendant
and, most significantly, in all but two judgment below had gone
against the railroad.5" Thus, the fact that the Supreme Court of
Appeals decided ten in favor of the railroad and only seven against
the railroad, must be balanced against the fact that the lower courts
had, in the same cases, rendered fifteen judgments against the
railroads and only two in their favor.
Out of these seventeen cases, perhaps five can be regarded
as significant.5 4 That is, these five involved principles important
to the railroads for, had they been decided against the railroad
party, they could possibly have become costly precedents in the
future. In the decision of these cases, Brannon sides with the
railroad for five times, Dent three. In the really big issue, involving
a child trespasser on the tracks, Brannon dissented sharply from
Dent's opinion that the railroad had a positive duty to maintain
-1 Loving v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 47 W. Va. 582, 35 S.E. 962 (1900) (action
for ejection from train; McWhorter reverses judgment for plaintiff); Neal
v. Ohio River R.R., 47 W. Va. 316, 34 S.E. 914 (1899) (action for diverting
a water course and causing damage; Brannon reverses judgment for plaintiff);
Seldomridge v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 46 W. Va. 569, 33 S.E. 293 (1899)
(master-servant; Brannon reverses judgment for plaintiff); Ravenswood, S. &
G. Ry. v. Woodyard, 46 W. Va. 558, 33 S.E. 285 (1899) railroad sues
to recover property; (Brannon reverses verdict for defendants); Price v. Chesa-
peake & 0. R.R., 46 W. Va. 538, 33 S.E. 255 (1899) (action for ejection
from train; Brannon reverses judgment for plaintiff); Claiborne v. Chesa-
peake & 0. R.R., 46 W. Va. 363, 33 S.E. 262 (1899) (railroad com-
plains of the size of an eminent domain award; Brannon reverses); Guinn
v. Ohio River R.R., 46 W. Va. 151, 33 S.E. 87 (1899) (eminent domain
and nuisance action against railroad; Brannon reverses judgment for the
plaintiff); McVey v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 46 W. Va. 111, 32 S.E.
1012 (1899) (administrator sues on wrongful death; McWhorter reverses
judgment for plaintiff.)
52 Lewis v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 47 W. Va. 656, 35 S.E. 908 (1900)
(loss of freight; McWhorter affirms judgment for plaintiff); Kay v. Glade
Creek & R.R., 47 W. Va. 467, 35 S.E. 973 (1900) (action for seizing land
for railroad construction and for fire started by locomotive sparks; Brannon
affirms judgment for plaintiff); West Virginia & P. R.R. v. Harrison County
Court, 47 W. Va. 273, 34 S.E. 786 (1899) (public bond subscription;
Brannon affirms decree for County Court); Uhl v. Ohio River Co., 47 W. Va.
59, 34 S.E. 934 (1899) (right of way and way of necessity; Dent reverses
verdict for railroad; Brannon concurs in special note); Landers v. Ohio
River R.R., 46 W. Va. 492, 33 S.E. 296 (1899) (personal injuries; divided
court (McWhorter) affirms judgment for plaintiff; Brannon and English
dissent); Bias v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 46 W. Va. 349, 33 S.E. 240 (1899)
(wrongful death; divided court [Dent] affirms verdict for plaintiff; Brannon
and English dissent); Hoover's Adm'x v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 46 W. Va.
268, 33 S.E. 224 (1899) (wrongful death; Dent reverses judgment for de-
fendant railroad).
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a lookout.55 It might be argued that Brannon's partiality towards
railroad defendants stemmed from the fact he had been president
of the abortive Weston & West Fork Railroad Company and a lead-
ing organizer of the Clarksburg, Weston & Glenville.56 This would
be grossly unfair. If this experience played any part in shaping his
approach towards these cases, it was more likely that it made him
sensitive to the perils of the business community than because he
had a financial interest in railroads, per se. The principles he
sought to establish in these cases fit, hand and glove, with his juris-
prudential attitudes already mentioned. The same is true for Dent.
While Dent stressed the helplessness of the average citizen con-
fronted with the awesome resources of a great railroad corporation,
Brannon stressed the role railroads were playing in opening up for
development the backwater reaches of a mountain state. The two
men complemented one another and, while both were on the Supreme
Court of Appeals, "railroad law" in West Virginia sometimes seems
to have been the victim of a judicial tug of war.
[This article will be concluded in the February issue.]
5
4 Seldomridge; Landers; Bias; Nighbert; and McVey.
55 See note 32, supra.5
6 R CE, THE LIFE OF JONATHAN M. BENNETT: A STUDY OF THE VIR-
GINIAS IN TRANSrrION 203-04 (1943).
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